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quarter of 1995, Texas employment
growth remained strong, particu-
larly in manufacturing. Preliminary
Dallas Fed estimates suggest that
the state’s total real output soared to
an annual rate of 7 percent in the
first quarter, up from roughly 4
percent in the fourth quarter of
1994.2 In contrast, in the first quar-
ter, U.S. real output increased at an
annual rate of 3 percent.
Texas Trades with Many Countries
In recent years, Mexico’s rapidly
expanding market may have over-
shadowed growing global demand
for Texas goods. More than 50
countries regularly purchase Texas
products. Most of these goods are
shipped to 10 countries: Mexico,
Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom,
Taiwan, China, Singapore, Korea,
Venezuela and the Netherlands
(Chart 1). These top 10 markets
account for almost 70 percent of
Texas merchandise exports. Typi-
cally, more than half of those Texas
exports are bound for Mexico.3
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t year-end 1994, Texas’ number
one trading partner lost half of
its buying power in the peso de-
valuation. Mexico bought 40 percent
of Texas merchandise exports last
year, and not surprisingly, Mexican
demand for Texas goods dropped
sharply in early 1995. But just as
Texas’ prospects for international
trade looked their worst, the state’s
merchandise exports surged to a
record-breaking $17 billion in the
first quarter of 1995.
So, why are Texas merchandise
exports soaring? While Mexico’s
demand for Texas goods dropped
abruptly, rising demand from Japan,
China and other countries pushed
Texas exports to unprecedented
levels. Much of the rising demand
has been for Texas’ chemical, elec-
tronic, computer and agricultural
products.
Exports represent a significant
share of Texas’ economy, contrib-
uting roughly 18 percent of total
gross state product, compared with
approximately 10.6 percent of total
gross domestic product for the
nation as a whole.1 In 1994, Texas’
$60 billion in merchandise exports
constituted about 51 percent of the
state’s total manufacturing sales, up
from 44 percent in 1993.
Texas exports stimulated growth
in the state even as the national
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to the rest of Texas’ trading part-
ners kept pace with that of Mexico,
rising 24 percent. After Mexico’s
peso devaluation, exports to these
other trading partners surged and
helped offset lost trade with Mexico.
In the first quarter of 1995, exports
to Mexico fell 14 percent. Exports
to the rest of Texas’ trading partners
jumped 15 percent, resulting in a 4
percent increase in total Texas ex-
ports.4 As shown in Table 1, rising
demand from Japan, Taiwan, China,
Korea and the Netherlands boosted
Texas’ first-quarter exports.
Other Currency Changes Soften
Peso’s Blow
Many factors influenced the
demand for Texas exports in the
first quarter, but the value of the
dollar was perhaps the most impor-
tant. Between the fourth quarter of
1994 and the first quarter of 1995,
the value of the dollar rose 53 per-
cent relative to the peso, greatly
increasing the price of U.S. exports
to Mexico.5 During the same period,
however, the value of the dollar
relative to most Texas trading part-
ners’ currencies fell. Texas goods
became relatively less expensive in
those markets, greatly mitigating
the effects of the dollar’s strength
relative to the peso.
An export-weighted value of the
dollar helps analysts evaluate the
impact of the changing exchange
rates of all of Texas’ trading part-
ners. The Texas value of the dollar
measures the real dollar/foreign
currency exchange rates for 44
countries, weighting them by their
importance to Texas trade.6 As
shown in Chart 3, the total Texas
export-weighted value of the dollar
increased from October 1994 to
March 1995, but not as much as
the dollar strengthened against the
peso. Even though the value of the
dollar fell against the currencies of
Chart 2
Texas Exports to Mexico and the
Rest of the World
(Adjusted for Inflation and Seasonal Patterns)
Index, January 1993 = 100
“Texas goods became
relatively less expensive in
those markets, greatly
mitigating the effects of
the dollar’s strength
relative to the peso.”
Table 1
Top 10 Texas Export Markets, First-Quarter 1995
(Adjusted for Inflation and Seasonal Patterns)
Percent change in exports
From fourth-quarter From first-quarter
1994 1994
1. Mexico –14 –4
2. Canada 3 36
3. Japan 37 63
4. United Kingdom –2 29
5. Taiwan 48 60
6. China 165 275
7. Singapore 7 30
8. Republic of Korea 20 49
9. Venezuela 1 40
10. Netherlands 12 43
Rest of exports (43 countries) 12 25
NOTE: Exports to Mexico would have fallen further without maquiladoras. See related article on page 9.
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most of Texas’ trading partners, the
export-weighted value of the dollar
increased because Mexico, as the
leading trading partner, has the
largest weight. In the first quarter of
1995, the total Texas export-weighted
value of the dollar rose 14 percent.
Several Texas Industries Surge
Although Texas ships a variety of
products to foreign markets, nearly
90 percent of those goods are from
10 industries. Table 2 ranks Texas’
top 10 export industries by the value
of sales between first-quarter 1994
and first-quarter 1995. During this
period, export growth was driven
by strong demand for goods from
four industries: chemicals, electron-
ics, industrial machinery (including
computers) and agriculture. To-
gether, products from these four
industries represented 97 percent
of the net gain in Texas exports.
Chemicals. On a year-over-year basis,
exports of chemicals and allied
products increased 50 percent in
the first quarter of 1995, represent-
ing 36 percent of the net increase
in Texas exports. Strong domestic
and international demand for petro-
chemicals spurred a boom for the
Texas chemical industry in 1994.
Until recently, however, capacity
constraints have limited Texas’ ex-
ports to the world; most products
were consumed by a prospering
U.S. economy. In the first quarter of
1995, however, slowing domestic
sales allowed Texas manufacturers
to meet demand from international
customers.
Petrochemicals and related engi-
neering and construction firms have
become an important segment of
the Texas energy industry.7 As a
major natural gas processor, the
Gulf Coast region is rich with the
coproducts necessary to produce
petrochemicals. Ethylene and pro-
pylene, for instance, are the build-
ing blocks for most plastics and
rubbers. Global demand for these
goods has stimulated the Houston
economy and led to several huge
expansion projects on the ship
channel. Construction contractors
with roots in the hydrocarbon pro-
cessing (or petrochemical) industry
have diversified to become multi-
national suppliers of engineering
and construction expertise, building
major industrial facilities, roads,
highways, airports, hotels and resorts
around the world. In 1994, five of
the top 20 industrial contractors in
the world were based in Texas and
generated $4.1 billion in foreign
revenues.8
Electronics and Electric Equipment.
Heavy worldwide demand for semi-
conductor computer chips and tele-
communications equipment helped
these industries contribute 27 per-
cent of the net increase in Texas
exports in the first quarter of 1995.
Although the United States is still
the world’s largest semiconductor
buyer, global demand is increasing
rapidly. Computer chips and other
Texas-produced electronic devices
are used in an expanding variety of
products, including personal com-
puters, cellular telephones, answer-
ing machines, cameras, automobiles
and microwave ovens. International
sales of Texas-produced telecom-
munications equipment also have
been growing rapidly. Texas pro-
duces switching components and
internal components of state-of-the-
art telecommunications networks,
such as fiber optic transmission
equipment.
Chart 3
Texas Export-Weighted Value of the Dollar
Index, 1985:1 = 100
Top 10, less Mexico
Total
Mexico













Top 10 Texas Export Industries, First-Quarter 1995
Value in Percent change from
millions first-quarter 1994
1. Chemicals $3,566 50
2. Electronics and electric equipment 3,377 35
3. Industrial machinery and computer equipment 3,105 25
4. Transportation equipment 1,252 –18
5. Agricultural production—crops 1,093 80
6. Instruments 697 6
7. Food and kindred products 558 6
8. Petroleum and coal products 503 14
9. Fabricated metal products 503 –16
10. Primary metal industries 480 12
SOURCE: Massachusetts Institute for Social and Economic Research.4
Global demand has led Texas’
high-tech industry to expand rapidly
in recent years, leading to construc-
tion of several huge factories. Two
of the largest microchip manufac-
turers in the world are located in
Austin: Motorola Inc. and Advanced
Micro Devices. Motorola is also the
world’s leading maker of micro-
controllers. Applied Materials, also
in Austin, is the world’s leading pro-
ducer of wafer fabrications systems
and a leading manufacturer of flat-
panel display screens used in por-
table computers and other electronic
devices. Texas Instruments, also a
major producer of semiconductors,
has been expanding in the Dallas
area, along with several large tele-
communications manufacturers.
Industrial Machinery and Computers.
While some electronics produced in
Texas are shipped worldwide as
parts, other electronics are assembled
in the state and exported as indus-
trial machinery and computers. In
the first quarter of 1995, computers
and nonelectrical equipment repre-
sented 19 percent of the net gain in
Texas exports.
Many of the world’s largest com-
puter manufacturers are located in
Texas, including Dell Computer
Corp. in Austin, Compaq Computer
Corp. in Houston and Texas Instru-
ments in Dallas. These firms have
been reporting strong sales, with a
backlog of orders for many of their
products.
Heavy international demand for
oil and gas field equipment has
also contributed to exports in this
industry. Texas oil service and
machinery companies have more
than replaced declining domestic
oil field activity by expanding into
international markets.
Agriculture. Shipments of agricultural
crops added 15 percent of the net
increase in Texas exports over the
past year. Texas crop exports in-
creased 80 percent between the
first quarter of 1994 and the first
quarter of 1995, and 65 percent of
the increase in sales went to China.
Exports to China tend to be very
volatile, but in the past year, several
factors led China to import large
volumes of corn, cotton, edible oil,
rice and wheat.9
As the nation’s number one cotton
producer, Texas has benefited as
U.S. exports of cotton climbed to
their highest level in 70 years. Strong
worldwide demand, along with the
adverse effects of insect infestations
and disease on cotton crops in
China, Pakistan and, to a lesser
extent, India have contributed to
the rise in exports and boom in
cotton prices.
Mexico Still Restraining Texas
Export Growth
Although exports have diversi-
fied the Texas economy, the drop
in sales to Mexico has restrained
export growth. Total Texas exports
grew slightly slower in the first
quarter of 1995 than in all of 1994.
Export growth would have surged
further if sales to Mexico had in-
creased at the same rate as in 1994.
A partial rebound in the value of
the peso suggests that exports to
Mexico may have picked up in the
second quarter (second-quarter state
export data were unavailable at
press time). As shown in Chart 3, in
the third quarter, the value of the
dollar depreciated 20 percent relative
to the peso, and the Texas export-
weighted value of the dollar also fell,
declining 8 percent.10 Still, a weak
Mexican economy will continue to
restrain Mexico’s consumption and
restrain Texas’ export growth.
—Fiona Sigalla
Notes
1 Gross state product data for Texas are
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas estimates
for 1994, and merchandise exports are
from the Massachusetts Institute for
Social and Economic Research (MISER).
Service exports for Texas and the United
States are assumed to equal 40 percent
of merchandise exports, which is the
average percentage of U.S. service ex-
ports to the world.
2 See Franklin D. Berger and Keith R.
Phillips, “A New Quarterly Output
Measure for Texas,” Federal Reserve
Bank of Dallas Economic Review, Third
Quarter, 1995.
3 The export data used in this article were
obtained from MISER, which makes
adjustments to data from the U.S. Census
Bureau, Foreign Trade Division. Exports
are measured by state of origin; prod-
ucts are measured from the state where
they begin the journey to point of ex-
port. This measure may attribute goods
to the state where they are warehoused
before beginning the journey to point
of export. In the case of Texas exports,
this measure likely overstates exports
to Mexico and understates exports to
Canada.
4 Exports to Mexico would have fallen
further without maquiladoras. (See
related article on page 9.)
5 The real value of the dollar against the
peso, according to the Dallas Fed’s
Trade-Weighted Value of the Dollar
Index, went from 90.1 to 137.8 from the
fourth quarter of 1994 to the first quarter
of 1995.
6 Texas’ largest trading partner, Mexico,
represents 33 percent of the index.
Canada represents 8 percent of the in-
dex, Japan 6 percent, the United King-
dom 5 percent and Taiwan 4 percent.
Overall, the dollar index represents 91.5
percent of Texas exports.
7 Bill Gilmer, “Houston’s Economy Con-
tinues to Improve,” Federal Reserve
Bank of Dallas, Houston Branch Hous-
ton Business, September 1994.
8 According to the Engineering News
Record, four Houston companies (M.W.
Kellogg, Raytheon Engineers, John
Brown/Davy, and Brown & Root) and
one San Antonio company (H.B. Zach-
ary) are listed among the top 20 compa-
nies, based on the values of contracts
signed in 1994. One other company
(Centex of Dallas) is number three in
the world in construction revenues but
has zero foreign revenues.
9 Rising demand and commodity prices,
government policies and inadequate
transportation and marketing systems
were among the factors leading to
China’s surge in agricultural imports.
For more information, see United States
Department of Agriculture, Economic
Research Service, Agricultural Outlook,
June 1995.
10 During the third quarter, the value of the
dollar fell 3 percent against the curren-






of the biases due to substitution
than on the biases due to quality
change and the introduction of new
goods. Furthermore, the biases
associated with substitution are
quantitatively small.
Second, while quality change
and the introduction of new goods
potentially pose big problems for
the CPI, there is very little hard
empirical evidence to suggest that
they in fact do so. In discussing the
potential problems with the CPI, it
is often overlooked that the Bureau
of Labor Statistics (BLS) has a variety
of mechanisms in place to handle
both quality change and the arrival
of new goods in the marketplace.
The question then becomes not
whether the CPI overstates inflation
because it neglects these develop-
ments, but rather how well the pro-
cedures used by the BLS perform
relative to a more ideal alternative.
The final point: trying to arrive at
an estimate of the overall bias in
the CPI is like trying to hit a moving
target. The BLS regularly updates its
procedures in response to perceived
problems with the CPI. Thus, prob-
lems that were serious in one time
period for a particular category of
goods may no longer be an issue.
It is not clear that in arriving at
an estimate of the overall bias re-
searchers can simply add up the
various number that have been
produced by different studies.
Substitution Biases
Three conceptually distinct types
of bias fall under the heading of
substitution biases: elementary
index functional form bias, com-
modity substitution bias and outlet
substitution bias.
Elementary index functional
form bias is a type of bias that
arises because the CPI does not
actually aggregate the prices of in-
dividual commodities, but rather is
an aggregation of price indexes.
This problem relates to the con-
struction of these elementary price
indexes. Why the problem arises
relates to the esoterica of index
study of known biases in the federal
government’s various price indexes
noted the remarkable lack of hard
evidence on the extent of the poten-
tial bias in the CPI.1 This was sur-
prising, given the great confidence
with which many economists tend
to assert there is “obviously an
upward bias in the reported CPI”
and probably at least 2 percentage
points a year.
The Dallas Fed study concluded:
“In view of the paucity of evidence
on the various potential biases in the
CPI, we are inclined to think that it
is better to err on the side of con-
servatism in guesstimating the size
of the overall bias. A figure of less
than 1 percent thus strikes us as a
plausible estimate of the overall
bias. The true figure could be a lot
larger or a lot smaller; at present
we simply do not know.”
In October 1994, the Congres-
sional Budget Office published its
own analysis of the problems with
the CPI, concluding that “the amount
of bias is not known, [but] the
existing empirical evidence, which
addresses many but not all of the
potential areas of mismeasurement,
indicates that the CPI has probably
grown faster than the cost of living
by between one-fifth and four-fifths
of a percentage point in recent
years.”2 In view of the recent re-
surgence of interest in the problems
with accurately measuring changes
in the cost of living, it is worth-
while to revisit the issues.
The problems that beset the CPI
as a measure of the cost of living
can be loosely grouped into two
categories. The first category is the
set of problems associated with
substitution behavior on the part of
consumers. The second is the set of
problems associated with changes
in the quality of goods and the
introduction of new goods. This
article raises three issues relating to
these problems.
First, economists’ understanding
of the extent of the two classes
of problem with the CPI is very
skewed. To date, researchers have
a much better handle on the extent
I
n June 1995, the Senate Finance
Committee appointed a panel of
economists to review the accuracy
of the consumer price index (CPI)
and to estimate the extent, if any,
to which the CPI overstates in-
creases in the cost of living.
The impetus for expert review of
the accuracy of the CPI does not
stem from the desire to have a better
measure of inflation per se. Rather,
the committee realized that a sig-
nificant proportion of the budget
of the federal government is in-
dexed to the CPI, so any significant
measurement error has important
budgetary implications.
In testimony before the Senate
earlier this year, Federal Reserve
Chairman Alan Greenspan noted
that about 30 percent of federal
outlays are indexed to movements
in the CPI, as are about 45 percent
of tax receipts. Given the impor-
tance of indexed programs and
taxes in the budget of the federal
government, if the annual inflation
adjustments in these programs were
reduced by just 1 percentage point,
the annual level of the deficit would
fall by about $55 billion after five
years, while the cumulative deficit
reduction over this period would be
nearly $150 billion, Greenspan esti-
mated. The question is, Does the
CPI overstate the true rate of infla-
tion by as much as 1 percent a year?
Two years ago, a Dallas Fed6
number construction; essentially, it
results from consumers’ tendency
to respond to sale prices by pur-
chasing more of a good that is on
sale. BLS economists estimate that
this form of bias may have added
0.4 to 0.5 percentage points to the
overall rate of inflation between
June 1992 and June 1993.3
Commodity substitution bias is
the best known and most exten-
sively studied of the potential biases
in the CPI. Substitution bias arises
because, while the CPI prices a
fixed market basket of goods over
time, consumers tend to substitute
away from goods that become
more expensive and toward goods
that become less expensive.
As the price of cellular telephones
falls relative to the price of stamps,
consumers will make more phone
calls and write fewer letters. The
CPI fails to take this kind of substi-
tution behavior into account, and
as a result, tends to overstate infla-
tion. The consensus estimate is that
this form of bias adds about 0.2
percentage points to the overall
inflation rate each year, although
the exact number will tend to be
bigger the further we are from the
base year and the greater the
change in relative prices.
A potential source of bias that has
received a lot of attention recently
is the so-called outlet substitution
bias. The idea here is that the
process by which the BLS chooses
outlets from which to collect price
quotes for inclusion in the CPI may
have missed the revolution in retail-
ing. Over the past 15 years or so,
low-cost, high-volume discount
outlets such as Wal-Mart and Sam’s
Club have grown rapidly, and
shoppers have switched from more
traditional outlets toward the newer
outlets that offer lower prices. One
early estimate of the potential size of
this bias put it at 0.25 percentage
points per year for the food at home
and motor fuel components of the
CPI.4 However, subsequent research
has shown that this figure may be
the compounded result of a variety
of effects.
Quality Adjustment and New Goods
The essence of the quality adjust-
ment problem is as follows. Sup-
pose the BLS has been tracking the
price of some specific brand of VCR
for inclusion in the CPI. At some
date, the chosen variety of VCR dis-
appears from store shelves, and in
its place retailers start offering a new,
higher priced model with additional
features. How much of the differ-
ence in the prices of the new and
old models should be treated as a
price increase, and how much
reflects quality improvement in the
VCR? In constructing a measure of
the change in the cost of living, it is
appropriate to exclude that part of
the price increase that results from
improvements in the quality of the
good.
When facing such a problem, BLS
field agents have numerous options.
If they deem the new and old pro-
ducts to be essentially the same in
a well-defined sense, they include
the entire price increase in the CPI
and do nothing more. The risk here
is that some quality improvements
are overlooked, imparting an up-
ward bias to the index. If the new
and old products are judged to be
different, then BLS agents try to
adjust for the quality change before
including the price in the CPI. There
are many ways to make these ad-
justments.
For example, BLS agents could
make an adjustment based on infor-
mation received from manufacturers
on the cost of the new features, as is
often done with autos. Each year
when the new models are intro-
duced, the BLS agents obtain cost
estimates from manufacturers that
allow them to subtract out that com-
ponent of the price increase that
stems from new features. Alterna-
tively, the BLS can make an adjust-
ment using a hedonic regression,
which relates the price of a good to
its characteristics. However, in many
cases neither of these methods can
be applied, and the BLS simply
imputes the price change for the
good in question. That is, the price
that gets entered in the CPI is some
average of the prices of similar
products.
The imputation procedure does
not obviously result in a biased esti-
mate of price change. However, if
manufacturers systematically tend to
time price increases to coincide with
the introduction of new models,
imputation may introduce price in-
creases that are too small into the
CPI, resulting on an overall down-
ward bias. During 1992, some 3.5 per-
cent of retail outlet prices collected
for inclusion in the CPI resulted in
product substitutions. Of these sub-
stitutions, 2 percent were consid-
ered “comparable” and no quality
adjustment was made. About 0.9 per-
cent of the prices were quality-
adjusted through the imputation
procedure, while the remaining 0.4
percent were directly quality-adjusted
(through the use of either hedonic
methods or cost information sup-
plied by manufacturers).
For many categories of goods, it
is generally accepted that manufac-
turers tend to time price increases
to coincide with the introduction of
new varieties. Two prominent ex-
ample are autos and apparel. Recent
research by the BLS has compared
the results of quality-adjusting the
apparel price indexes using tradi-
tional and hedonic methods. Re-
searchers have long suspected that
the CPI understates inflation in the
apparel commodities indexes. Evi-
dence supporting this suspicion is
shown in Chart 1, which plots the
trend in the apparel commodities
component of the CPI and the over-
all CPI since 1980.5 It is clear that
from 1981 through 1986 the apparel
commodities component of the CPI
rose at a slower rate than the over-
all CPI. This observation, coupled
with evidence that apparel inflation
was no slower than overall infla-
tion, suggested to the BLS that the
procedures for calculating its apparel
indexes needed revision.
Two recent studies addressed the
issue of quality adjustment in the
apparel indexes and found that the
traditional methods appeared as7
likely to underestimate price change
as they were to overestimate price
change.6 The first study showed
that an index for women’s suits that
employed hedonic regressions to
determine the comparability of sub-
stitutions and in the case of non-
comparable substitutions to make
direct quality adjustments grew 0.7
percentage points slower than the
published index, suggesting, as most
economists suspected, an upward
bias in the published index. How-
ever, a similar index for women’s
coats and jackets was shown to
grow 3.9 percentage points more
than the official index, suggesting
the existence of a downward bias
in the published index.
More extensive results are re-
ported in the second study for a
broader range of apparel indexes,
where it is shown that “While differ-
ences are observed between pub-
lished indexes (those with quality
adjustments) and nonhedonic
indexes (those without quality
adjustments), the results reveal no
consistent differences across strata
or aggregate level indexes.”
What about the problem of new
goods? In many ways, the problems
posed by the arrival of new goods
is similar to that posed by quality
change. One way of distinguishing
between the two is to classify the
quality problem as being the result
of some change in a product’s
characteristics, while the new goods
problem is the result of the addition
of new characteristics or a rebundling
of existing characteristics.7 Thus,
the invention of the personal com-
puter would be classified as a new
goods problem, while improvements
in the memory and speed of the
personal computer would be classi-
fied as a quality problem. There is
essentially no empirical evidence
on how well the BLS handles the
emergence of new goods. Some
researchers have made suggestive
theoretical calculations that show
that the failure to properly account
for the introduction of new goods
could impart a substantial upward
bias to the CPI. But for now, these
calculations remain speculative.
While it is well-known that the
omission of new goods from the
consumer price index can cause
potentially dramatic overstatement
of the rate of inflation, new goods
are included in the index through a
variety of mechanisms. A recent
BLS working paper provides a use-
ful taxonomy of new goods and
discusses how the CPI handles each
type. This paper distinguishes be-
tween replacement items (which
are new versions of existing goods
that have been, or are about to be,
discontinued, such as new model
year cars), supplemental items
(which are entirely new versions of
existing products, such as cereal)
and entirely new items (which are
not closely related to any existing
or previously available item). As a
result of changes made in 1978,
many new products that emerge
are in fact gradually introduced into
the CPI.
Calculating the Overall Bias
A hierarchy of evidence is avail-
able to address the question of
whether the CPI overstates the rate
of increase in the cost of living.
First, there are those biases that are
known to exist and have been
quantified. These studies can be
further subdivided between biases
for which there have been multiple
attempts at quantification (such as
the well-known commodity substi-
tution bias) and those for which
there have only been one or two
studies (such as the bias due to
outlet substitution). Then there are
those biases that researchers suspect
exist but for which they lack quanti-
tative estimates. The primary ex-
ample here is the problem with
accurately measuring changes in the
costs of medical care. Even given
this classification, we need to dis-
tinguish between biases that have
been identified and eliminated and
biases that have been identified and
remain a problem.
Trying to estimate the overall
bias in the CPI is like trying to hit a
moving target. The BLS has proved
to be reasonably diligent in correct-
ing biases in the CPI as soon as
their significance becomes evident.
Examples include the correction for
the treatment of housing and the
elimination of the housing depre-
ciation bias. More recently, the BLS
has taken steps to alleviate the
problems caused by the elementary
functional form bias.
One prominent researcher in the
theory of price measurement has
asserted that the various biases in
the CPI are approximately additive.
Chart 1
The U.S. Consumer Price Index and Apparel Prices, 1980–95
Index, 1982–84 = 100
Apparel
Overall CPI











SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics.8
While in theory the assumption of
additivity may be correct, in prac-
tice the estimates may be mixing
different types of biases. Then there
is also the important fact that these
estimates of bias come with some
sort of standard error.
Nevertheless, there is likely an
upward bias in the CPI, and the
figure of around 1 percent hinted
at by Chairman Greenspan in his
testimony earlier this year is as good
an estimate as any. The examples
of overstatement noted above not-
withstanding, it is clear that the bulk
of the evidence supports the notion
of an upward bias in the index. The
BLS is even willing to concede an
error of 0.6 percentage points due to
substitution biases (see the Decem-
ber 1993 Monthly Labor Review).
However, absent a comprehensive
audit of the CPI (say, along the
lines of Robert Gordon’s audit of
the deflators for producers’ durable
equipment), there will always be
substantial uncertainty surrounding
the size of the bias in the CPI.
While it is true that most estimates
to date have tended toward an
upward bias, the standard error, if
you will, surrounding these esti-
mates is quite large and possibly of
the same order of magnitude as the
estimates of the bias itself.
Conclusions
The CPI is the most important
measure of inflation the federal gov-
ernment publishes. The widespread
use of the CPI to index components
of the federal budget means that
errors in measuring the CPI have
potentially large budgetary implica-
tions. The CPI is used to index
personal income tax brackets and
Social Security and other welfare
payments so as to protect taxpayers
and Social Security recipients from
the pernicious effects of inflation.
The idea here is that a taxpayer’s
liability should not increase just be-
cause the price level has increased,
if the real purchasing power of his
or her income has not gone up also.
On the benefits side, the idea is
that Social Security recipients are
entitled to some real amount of
purchasing power rather than a
nominal amount whose purchasing
power is systematically eroded by
inflation. However, insofar as the
price index used to compensate tax-
payers and Social Security recipients
for increases in the cost of living
overstates the rate at which prices
are increasing, taxpayers and Social
Security recipients are being over-
compensated for inflation and are
effectively receiving an additional
subsidy from the government. As
noted earlier, the potential magni-
tude of these excess transfers is
quite large, and their elimination
could go a long way toward elimi-
nating the budget deficit.
Evidence that the CPI overstates
the rate of increase in the cost of
living is remarkably thin. Researchers
do know that, as a result of various
types of substitution behavior, the
CPI overstates the rate of increase
in the CPI by as much as 0.6 percent
a year. They have no idea, how-
ever, how much quality change and
the emergence of new goods adds
to this bias. It could be as much as
an additional 0.4 percentage points
a year, and it could be zero.
What is surprising and often
neglected in the debate over the
accuracy of the CPI is the fact that
the methods employed by the BLS
to handle quality change in the CPI
seem to be as prone to overcom-
pensate for quality change as they
are to undercompensate for quality
change, leaving the overall direction
of the bias uncertain. In some areas,
the BLS freely admits that very little
is done to correct for quality change.
The prime example is, of course,
medical care, where accurate price
measurement is fraught with tech-
nical and conceptual difficulties.
Nonetheless, it is important to keep
in mind that just as there are costs
to overstating the rate of inflation,




1 Mark A. Wynne and Fiona Sigalla, “A
Survey of Measurement Biases in Price
Indexes,” Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
Research Paper, no. 9340, 1993. Also, a
version of this paper focusing on the
CPI appeared in the Federal Reserve
Bank of Dallas Economic Review, Second
Quarter, 1994.
2 “Is the Growth of the CPI a Biased
Measure of Changes in the Cost of
Living?” CBO Papers (Washington D.C.:
Congressional Budget Office, October
1994, vii).
3 Brent R. Moulton, “Basic Components
of the CPI: Estimation of Price Change,”
Monthly Labor Review, December 1993,
and Marshall B. Reinsdorf and Brent R.
Moulton, “The Construction of Basic
Components of Cost of Living Indexes,”
mimeo, U.S. Department of Labor, May
1994.
4 Marshall Reinsdorf, “The Effect of Outlet
Price Differentials on the U.S. Consumer
Price Index,” in Murray F. Foss, Marilyn
E. Manser and Allan H. Young, eds.,
Price Measurements and Their Uses,
NBER Studies in Income and Wealth,
vol. 57 (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press for National Bureau of Economic
Research, 1993).
5 This chart is adapted from Marshall
Reinsdorf, Paul Liegey and Ken Stewart,
“New Ways of Handling Quality Change
in the U.S. Consumer Price Index,”
mimeo, U.S. Department of Labor, July
1995.
6 The relevant studies are Paul Liegey,
“Adjusting Apparel Indexes in the CPI
for Quality Differences,” in Murray F.
Foss, Marilyn E. Manser and Allan H.
Young, eds., Price Measurements and
Their Uses, NBER Studies in Income and
Wealth, vol. 57 (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press for National Bureau of
Economic Research, 1993) and “Apparel
Price Indexes: Effects of Hedonic Ad-
justment,” Monthly Labor Review, May
1994, 38–45.
7 Dennis Fixler suggests this distinction in
“The Consumer Price Index: Underlying
Concepts and Caveats,” Monthly Labor
Review, December 1993.9
Beyond the Border
coincided with the slowdown in
the U.S. economy. Since the great
majority of maquiladora production
is destined for the U.S. market, the
industry is particularly sensitive to
U.S. growth rates. Thus, with the
recovery of the U.S. economy as of
1992 came a resurgence of maquila-
dora employment growth (Table 1).
Maquiladoras and NAFTA
The maquiladora program will
change under the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
New rules for maquiladoras are
taking effect in two phases, the first
lasts from 1994 through 2000; the
second starts with the next century.
The maquiladora industry’s basic
operating framework will not change
in the first phase, but maquiladoras’
access to domestic markets will be
gradually liberalized. By 2000, ma-
quiladoras will be able to sell to
the domestic market
85 percent of the
value of their ex-
port production in
the preceding year,
up from 50 percent
in 1993. And in
2001, maquiladoras
will be allowed to




important change to the maquila-
dora program takes place under the
second phase. In 2001, the provi-
sion that essentially defines the pro-
gram—that of duty-free importation
of inputs into Mexico, regardless
of origin—is abandoned. Instead,
North American rules of origin will
determine duty-free status for a
given import, while duty drawback
provisions will apply to non-North
American inputs.
By the turn of the century, it is
very likely that Mexico will have
revised its tariff schedules for third
countries in a way that dramatically
reduces most duties, especially for
the inputs maquiladoras rely on
heavily. Mexico’s intent, in general,
Increasing Economic Importance
Even before the devaluation, the
maquiladora industry had become
an important component of the
Mexican economy. In 1994, it con-
tributed nearly $6 billion in foreign
exchange to Mexico, making it the
country’s second largest source of
international reserves. The maquila-
dora industry’s share in total Mexi-
can manufacturing employment
reached 26 percent last year, up
from just 5.1 percent in 1982.
Maquiladora exports play a sig-
nificant role in Mexican–U.S. trade.
At $26 billion, 1994 exports repre-
sented more than 43 percent of total
U.S. imports from Mexico. Maquila-
dora products represented an even
higher share, 52 percent, of manu-
facturing imports from Mexico.
Although the Mexican maquila-
dora program has existed since
1965, the industry is perhaps best
known for its spectacular growth
during the 1980s. From 1983 through
1988, the number of maquiladora
plants averaged annual growth of
15.9 percent; employment in the
industry grew an average 19.7 per-
cent annually in the same period.
Other indicators also grew during
this period: imported raw materials
rose 27.7 percent, value-added rose
20.5 percent and gross production
grew by 25.4 percent.
The industry experienced a de-




Indicators of the Maquiladora Industry
Year-to-year
change
1994 (percent) 1993 1992 1991
Plants 2,085 –1.4 1.9 8.4 12.4
Employment 579.4 6.9 7.2 8.2 4.7
(Thousands of workers)
Imported raw materials 19.9 14.1 23.2 15.6 16.8
(Billions of dollars)
Value-added 5.9 8.6 12.8 16.0 18.4
(Billions of dollars)




wo million Mexican workers
have lost their jobs since the
December 1994 peso devaluation,
and some companies in Mexico have
even shut down operations. But
while most Mexicans must ride out
the recession that followed the de-
valuation, the maquiladora industry
is providing one of the country’s
few bright spots—creating jobs,
earning badly needed foreign ex-
change and attracting direct invest-
ment in modern plants.1,2
Because maquiladoras have
dollar-denominated budgets but
pay costs in pesos, the devaluation
brought a substantial, overnight
reduction in their peso costs. In this
sense, the maquiladora industry
benefited from the dollar’s higher
value relative to the peso in 1995,
as evidenced by recent employ-
ment numbers.
In the first five months of 1995,
maquiladora employment rose 9.7
percent (relative to the year-earlier
period) to a total of 617,984 work-
ers. Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua,
across the Mexican–U.S. border from
El Paso, Texas, employs the largest
concentration of maquiladora
workers, with about one-fourth of
the total. Maquiladora employment
in Juarez grew 12 percent during
the first five months of 1995, far
surpassing its growth of 6.1 percent
in 1994 and 2.3 percent in 1993.
The maquiladora industry should
continue to grow this year because
of its enhanced cost effectiveness
brought on by the peso devaluation.
The net gain for maquiladoras in
1995, however, will not equal the
rate of devaluation since inflation,
especially through peso–wage
pressures, will have eroded some
of the sector’s gains.10
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Beyond the Border…concluded
will be to ensure that maquiladoras
continue to find the Mexican invest-
ment climate in 2001 sufficiently
attractive to remain in the country.
Moreover, it’s foreseeable that even
zero duties will apply to those inputs
that are simply unavailable in North
America, as is the case with some
electronic components that are
produced solely in Asian countries
right now. As for the U.S.-imposed
duties, these are already low in
most cases and should remain low
or fall if such duties are found to
be negatively affecting maquiladora
producers, who come primarily
from the United States.
An important side effect of the
duty drawback provisions of 2001
is that during the seven-year period
1994–2000, maquiladora producers
may encourage third-country sup-
pliers to locate in North America in
order to guarantee that duty-free
treatment will be preserved after
2000. Another option for maquila-
doras is to develop relationships with
potential local suppliers that could
become new sources to replace
third-country suppliers. Either way,
the net result should be greater
direct investment in the region.
Conclusion
To the extent that NAFTA creates
a more competitive Mexican indus-
trial sector, greater potential local
sources of supply for the maquila-
doras are likely to emerge, especially
through joint-venture associations.
Thus, as maquiladoras are able to
sell more to, and buy more from,
their Mexican manufacturing coun-
terparts, they will become more
entrenched in the national economy.
In essence, these linkages between
the maquiladora and nonmaquila-
dora sectors will end up blending
the two into a single, stronger
Mexican manufacturing sector.
Although NAFTA brings about
the elimination of the maquiladora
program in 2001, the program’s
reason for being will have also been
eliminated. By 2001, Mexican in-
dustry will be benefiting from more
generalized conditions of freer trade
and investment that in the past
were associated exclusively with
maquiladoras. At the start of the
next century, there will probably be
few distinguishable characteristics
between what is now a maquiladora
and a nonmaquiladora operation
since by that time maquiladoras, if
they desire, can direct their entire
production to the domestic market.
Conversely, there will be nonma-
quiladora plants directing 100 per-
cent of their production to the
export market, as the maquiladoras
are now required to do. In sum, the
maquiladora label may no longer
exist by 2001, but the industry itself
will have become a critical part of a




1 A maquiladora is typically a foreign-
owned manufacturing plant that pro-
duces chiefly for exports to the United
States.
2 This column is based on material that
appeared in Business Frontier, a publi-
cation of the El Paso Branch of the
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas. For
more information about the publica-
tion, call (915) 521-8231. Back issues
are available on the Dallas Fed’s online
bulletin board Fed Flash, (214) 922-5199
or (800) 333-1953.11
Regional Update
FURTHER INFORMATION ON THE DATA
For more information on employment data,
see “Reassessing Texas Employment Growth”
(Southwest Economy, July/August 1993). For
more information on TIPI, see “The Texas Indus-
trial Production Index” (Dallas Fed Economic
Review, November 1989). For more information
on the Texas Leading Index and its components,
see “The Texas Index of Leading Indicators:
A Revision and Further Evaluation” (Dallas Fed
Economic Review, July 1990).
Online economic data and articles are avail-
able on the Dallas Fed’s electronic bulletin board,
Fed Flash (214) 922-5199 or (800) 333-1953.
REGIONAL ECONOMIC INDICATORS
Texas Employment Total Nonfarm Employment
Texas Private
Leading TIPI Construc- Manufac- Govern- service- New
Index total Mining tion turing ment producing Texas Louisiana Mexico
6/95 112.4 119.0 157.1 400.9 1,032.1 1,447.8 5,008.0 8,045.9 1,785.1 687.2
5/95 112.3 119.1 157.7 399.1 1,032.8 1,445.0 4,986.4 8,021.0 1,786.5 686.5
4/95 111.2 118.8 158.1 400.1 1,035.0 1,441.6 4,980.1 8,014.9 1,783.2 685.8
3/95 110.0 118.7 158.6 402.7 1,034.1 1,437.9 4,946.7 7,980.0 1,784.4 685.3
2/95 111.1 119.1 158.3 404.3 1,031.0 1,438.2 4,927.9 7,959.7 1,782.4 684.3
1/95 110.5 118.9 158.3 404.9 1,026.9 1,436.5 4,900.0 7,926.6 1,781.8 681.5
12/94 111.5 118.3 159.1 398.1 1,024.8 1,433.5 4,917.8 7,933.3 1,774.5 675.3
11/94 111.9 118.2 160.1 392.7 1,021.9 1,427.0 4,892.5 7,894.2 1,764.0 674.2
10/94 112.0 118.5 160.7 388.3 1,018.7 1,424.6 4,864.4 7,856.7 1,755.1 669.0
9/94 111.9 118.4 163.1 387.9 1,017.6 1,417.8 4,836.7 7,823.1 1,743.8 664.5
8/94 112.1 118.4 162.8 383.2 1,014.2 1,423.4 4,818.7 7,802.3 1,729.3 658.3
7/94 111.4 118.3 162.5 380.6 1,010.7 1,414.1 4,797.8 7,765.7 1,719.4 660.2
Total Nonfarm Employment
Index, January 1991 = 100
Texas Industrial Production Index
Texas Leading Index and Nonfarm Employment
Index, January 1991 = 100
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The District economy held steady
in June. Employment growth was up
slightly, thanks to a surge in the service
sector. The construction industry showed
renewed signs of strength. Manufactur-
ing indicators continue to be weak,
however. Overall, economic indicators
suggest that the District economy will
weaken slightly in the second half of the
year, but growth will remain positive.
District employment growth in-
creased slightly to a 2.8-percent annual
rate in June, compared with a 2.6-percent
annual rate of growth in the first half.
Stronger employment growth in Texas
in June offset weakness in Louisiana
and New Mexico. Most of the faster
employment growth was in the service
sector. Strong job growth in communi-
cations, business services and hotels
outweighed continued weakness in
transportation, finance, legal services,
and retail and wholesale trade.
Construction activity showed signs
of strength in June. After a very weak
first half, contract values picked up in
June, led by a surge in highway con-
struction. Residential contract values
showed signs of a rebound, and anec-
dotal reports suggest that new home
sales are rising. Nonresidential construc-
tion also accelerated, boosted by strong
retail and warehouse building.
Manufacturing activity continues to
be weak. Manufacturing employment
fell in May and June, the first two-month
consecutive decline since early 1993.
The manufacturing slowdown has been
broad-based, with the exception of con-
tinued strong growth in electronics, com-
puters and oil field machinery.
The Texas Leading Index rebounded
in the second quarter, following declines
since last November. Strong gains in
the Texas stock index and a rebound in
the Texas value of the dollar have been
key sources of strength in the index.
Several indicators continue to be weak;
the Texas help-wanted index, for in-
stance, declined sharply in June after
strong growth throughout most of the
first half of 1995. Recent movements in
the leading index suggest that the
gradual slowing in the Texas economy
will continue in the second half of this





P A I D
DALLAS, TEXAS
PERMIT NO. 151
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS
P.O. BOX 655906
DALLAS, TEXAS  75265–5906
FED FLASH
Updated daily,
Fed Flash is available
free, 24 hours a day,
seven days a week.
The electronic bulletin
board offers hundreds of
data files. Just dial
(214) 922-5199 or
(800) 333-1953.
n Dallas Fed publications, such as The Southwest Economy, Economic Review,
Financial Industry Studies and Trade-Weighted Value of the Dollar
n Interest-rate data
n Savings bond redemption tables
n Treasury note and bond auction results
n Regional economic data
n Federal Reserve news
Access to Fed Flash requires a personal computer with communications software, a modem and a telephone.
Dial (214) 922-5199 or (800) 333-1953 to gain access to the system. Parameters: no parity, 8 data bits, 1 stop bit
and up to 14,400 baud modem. For more information about Fed Flash, call (214) 922-5178.
FED FLASH
The Dallas Fed’s
electronic bulletin board